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ABSTRACT 
 Leaders are inundated with complex decisions in chaotic environments that have 
ripple effects across any organization. This project studies Department of Defense 
program managers to better understand how a program manager creates situational 
awareness and understanding in chaotic program environments. Using qualitative 
research and conducting face-to-face interviews, this project focuses on how program 
managers gain insight in the decision-making process. This study provides a greater level 
of insight into these issues and will be the basis of future research. This study focuses on 
the emergence of six categories—sensemaking, consensus-making, trust, tacit 
knowledge, explicit knowledge, and the environment. Understanding the fundamental 
principles that guide decision-making will help program managers make sense of 
complex and chaotic program environments. 
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been managing weapons acquisition in 
support of war efforts dating back to the Second Continental Congress and the 
Revolutionary War. Since then, the acquisition process has become significantly more 
complex, morphing into a systematic process with phases, events, and a plethora of rules, 
regulations, laws, and statutes. Today, the DoD is one of the largest and most complex 
businesses in the world. It employs over three million people; has a budget of nearly $640 
billion; manages plants, property, and equipment at over 5,000 different locations 
worldwide; and uses over 30 million acres of land (Department of Defense [DoD], 2018). 
The DoD’s mission is to defend the homeland, deter war, and if necessary, defeat 
adversaries anywhere, anytime by land, sea, or air (DoD, 2018). In pursuit of this mission, 
the DoD equips the force with the most cutting-edge, disruptive, and leap-ahead 
technologies and instruments of war. The DoD program manager is responsible to lead this 
process. The program manager’s job is to manage defense acquisition programs from 
cradle to grave and acquire technologies at the lowest cost and in a timely manner, while 
achieving the highest levels of technical performance.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Program management is both a science and an art. The science of program 
management is the application of technical processes that produce technical solutions to 
satisfy key performance parameters with traceability to user requirements. The art of 
program management is the navigation of law and regulation and the skillful application 
of scarce resources to fulfill needs-based requirements, in an event-driven schedule, with 
time-based resources. Leadership traits associated with successful program managers 
include strong communication skills, the ability to think strategically, the capacity to think 
creatively, and the aptitude to promote teamwork. Program managers must make calculated 
decisions to support positive cost, schedule, and performance outcomes because their 
decisions are of strategic importance, affect human lives, and have ripple effects spanning 
several decades.  
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The environment in which program managers make decisions is complex and 
bureaucratic, requiring acquisition professionals who are highly trained and competent. 
Factors such as competing acquisition decision support systems, the rules and regulations 
that bind the process, the stakeholders who influence defense acquisition, the speed and 
complexity at which technology advances, and the rapid emergence of threats may lead to 
life-cycle management inefficiencies. Such factors may also help perpetuate defense 
acquisition reform.  
Today, the user’s demand for fast, reliable, and dependable equipment has pushed 
both political and military leaders to implement new organizations as a form of acquisition 
reform. The speed at which requirements are generated may be perceived as too slow, and 
the acquisition life cycle may be perceived as too long. Such perceptions have given birth 
to the Army’s Futures Command, an organization designed to generate fast, accurate 
requirements and system prototypes before Milestone A and expedite weapon procurement 
through technology maturation. With the introduction of a new major command in the 
Army, there are potential complexities that will be introduced to the acquisition corps and 
the program manager. The system could be instrumental in fixing the requirements process, 
or it could simply add another layer of bureaucracy, adding more chaos and 
unpredictability into the decision-making process. 
In addition to creating Futures Command, the office of Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics (AT&L) is being restructured to drive innovation and ensure warfighter 
dominance on the battlefield. This recent organizational change has divided AT&L into 
two different branches: Acquisition and Sustainment, and Research and Engineering. The 
intent is similar to the Futures Command approach, to create an environment conducive to 
producing rapid results for the user. Similar to the dilemma with the Futures Command, 
the program manager will have to navigate system-level decisions through more 
bureaucratic processes compared to the original AT&L organizational model. The creation 
of two separate organizations focused on different system outcomes will affect the 
decision-making process for future program managers.  
Despite such attempts to reform DoD acquisition in the past, it appears that 
programs such as Joint Strike Fighter, Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, and 
3 
Future Combat Systems continue to underperform by exceeding their allocated budget, 
slipping schedule, or failing to produce. A factor potentially contributing to this issue is the 
difficulty in synchronizing the three interrelated decision support systems: The Joint 
Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the Planning Programming 
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE), and the Defense Acquisition Management 
System (DAMS). These decision support systems describe what to acquire, how much 
money the program manager is allocated, and the process in which such procurement will 
take place. However, the JCIDS process is needs driven, the PPBE process is calendar 
driven, and the DAMS is event driven, all of which may lead to inefficient program 
management. In theory, the three decision support systems work in concert, which provides 
the program manager a framework for delivering cutting-edge technologies to the 
warfighter in a timely fashion. In practice, synchronizing efforts across the three pillars 
seems to be a daunting task and if not accomplished, may lead to underperforming 
programs. This may create an unforgiving environment for the program manager, the 
warfighter, and our industry partners. As a result, the program manager may be more prone 
to be risk averse, make decisions in an untimely manner, and let environmental factors 
influence decision-making, in place of best business practices or urgency of requirements.  
Further adding complexity to DoD acquisition is the plethora of rules, regulations, 
laws, and statutes governing the process and the levels of oversight from several competing 
entities. Organizations such as Congress, the executive branch, industry, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military materiel 
commands, and service acquisition executives influence and oversee the DoD acquisition 
process. These organizations have produced hundreds of thousands of pages of regulations, 
laws, and statutes that program managers must navigate when managing a program. This 
oversight and these regulations have slowed all aspects of the acquisition process from 
implementing contracts, to generating requirements, and conducting test and evaluation. 
Complexity is further introduced into the acquisition environment by our 
adversaries. We live in an environment when our adversaries are adopting new methods 
and means to challenge the United States. They are developing multi-domain threats, 
hybrid strategies, and nuclear weapons, and are capitalizing on advancements in robotics, 
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cyber, space and hypersonic. Threats such as Russia and China pose near peer capabilities 
and are considered pacing threats to the United States. North Korea and Iran continue 
nuclear proliferation, and radical ideologues and trans-regional organizations like ISIS and 
Al Qaeda remain threats. Technologies such as laser and radio frequency weapons, swarms, 
synthetic biology, rail guns, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomous equipment will 
disrupt future warfare. These emerging threats have fueled acquisition reform, stimulated 
the development of rapid acquisition procedures, and further complicated the environment 
in which the program managers operate.  
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT  
The purpose of this research is not to understand how program managers make 
decisions, but rather, to recognize how a program manager gains insight in the decision-
making process. Despite decades of acquisition reform, programs continue to 
underperform and experience cost, schedule, and performance slippages. In an 
environment so dynamic and complex, it is imperative to understand how a program 
manager creates situational awareness and understanding in chaotic program environments 
and how it correlates with program performance.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is that there appears to be a knowledge gap in current literature in 
understanding how program managers formulate their view of the world to make complex 
decisions.  
D. SCOPE  
We interviewed two active duty Army program managers in the rank of colonel 
who currently manage ACAT I Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This allowed us to 
gather precise data about the decision-making process in the DoD acquisition environment 
through personal experience. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted 
roughly one hour each. We conducted our research in a time-constrained environment 
spanning a period of five months. 
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E. METHOD 
This study was conducted using a modified grounded theory method for conducting 
qualitative research focused on obtaining data through a series of questions. Contrary to 
conducting quantitative research, which focuses on gathering available numeric data to 
prove or disprove a theory, qualitative research uses observation of human behavior in a 
specific environment to gather non-numeric data and generate a theory to support such 
data. To obtain the necessary data to conduct our analysis, we began by reviewing relevant 
information regarding the decision-making process. In doing so, we gained the requisite 
amount of knowledge required to understand how humans gain insight into the decision-
making process. This information is presented in Chapter II, Literature Review.  
In collecting our data, we utilized the one-on-one interview method. Compiling 
such data allowed us to conduct inductive cross-coding and categorization. The purpose of 
cross-coding and categorization is to index information themes to better understand the 
data presented from the interviews. Ultimately, the purpose is to become more aware of 
how a program manager gains insight into the decision-making process. 
Following the coding and categorization process, we provide an in-depth analysis 
of the data and illuminate the results of the interview process. We then analyze the data to 
gain an understanding of how a program manager gains insight into the decision-making 
process. Finally, we conclude by introducing two hypotheses and theories that we deduced 
from the analysis of the data.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The intent of this chapter is to highlight literature written on individual and 
organizational decision-making, and the factors associated with each. First, the history of 
decision-making is presented to establish a baseline understanding of how cognitive 
psychology has evolved over time. Second, sensemaking and how environmental factors 
can influence the Cynefin Framework are illuminated. Third, analytical, intuitive, and dual 
process decision-making theories are explained. Fourth, an extensive review of the 
characteristics of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) from both an individual and 
organizational perspective is conducted. Finally, Klein’s recognition-primed decision 
model and Rasmussen’s decision-making process are revealed.  
B. HISTORY OF DECISION-MAKING 
The history of decision-making can be traced back several thousand years from the 
prehistoric era to the 21st century. Knowing the historical background and the evolution of 
decision-making will facilitate our research and help illuminate specific areas of the 
decision-making process that impact how DoD program managers make complex 
decisions. Figure 1 presents a timeline of major developments in decision-making theory. 
Throughout history, human beings have studied human behavior, psychology, the 
cognitive process, and problem-solving to make sense of how decisions are made and why. 
Countless philosophies, theories, and terms have been coined to help dissect and 
understand the practice. Buchanan and O’Connell (2006) note that the earliest records of 
decision-making literature highlight the fact that human beings’ decisions were guided by 
consultation with the gods through interpretations of dreams, entrails, and smoke. The 
authors found that the early Greeks, for example, would travel to the Delphi oracle and 
consult the gods prior to making any major decision. They further state that during this 




Figure 1. History of Decision-Making. Source: Buchanan and O’Connell (2006).
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In the fourth century B.C., the Athenians introduced voting as a method of decision-
making (Ober, 2007). In fact, Socrates was put to death after a public trial in which 500 
Athenian citizens voted and found him guilty of corrupting the minds of the young (Ober, 
2007). Continuing his philosophical debates were Plato and Aristotle who contributed 
greatly to the study of decision-making (Ober, 2007). They debated how things were 
perceived and how knowledge was gained (Ober, 2007). On one hand, Plato argued that 
one makes decisions based on the soul and not the senses (Ober, 2007). Contrary to this 
philosophy, Aristotle believed that people make decisions on the information gained 
through the senses (Ober, 2007). The gut versus brain dichotomy is still alive today and 
discussed at great length in several scholarly articles and bodies of knowledge relating to 
the study of decision-making.  
In the 17th century, mathematician Daniel Bernoulli contributed greatly to the 
fields of probability and statistics (Faccarello, 2016). Bernoulli began studying the subject 
of random events and how a human could use statistics and probability to make decisions 
that would be in their best interests (Faccarello, 2016). This laid the foundations of risk 
management, a practice used in almost every business organization today (Faccarello, 
2016). Bernoulli’s work paved the way for several other theorists such as Carl Friedrich 
Gauss and Francis Galton, who gave birth to the bell curve of normal distribution and the 
concept of regression (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Such statistical and data analysis 
tools remain the bedrock of complex decision-making to this day.  
In the early 1900s, theorists such as Nobel laureate Herbert Simon greatly 
contributed to the body of knowledge on complex decision-making (Buchanan & 
O’Connell, 2006). Simon spent his whole life researching the decision-making process and 
is known for his theories of bounded rationality and satisficing (Buchanan & O’Connell, 
2006). Simon believed that human beings are not rational thinkers and that they are only 
as good as their cognitive capabilities (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). This thought gave 
birth to artificial intelligence, a field in which Herbert Simon is known as a pioneer 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Simon’s contribution to the study of decision-making was 
enormous and continues to influence modern-day theorists.  
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Today, theorists such as Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, James March, and 
Henry Mintzberg carry the torch handed off from Herbert Simon and other prominent 
preceding theorists (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Their contributions have led to the 
development of Prospect Theory, groupthink, organizational decision-making, strategic 
decision-making, and several heuristics attempting to simplify the decision-making process 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Their research continues to highlight that risk is 
inescapable in any line of work (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Whether it be in combat, 
on Wall Street, in the acquisition community, or in personal life, the decisions one makes 
carry a certain level of risk that must be mitigated during the decision-making process. 
Decision-making and risk mitigation is a game of numbers that continues to evolve over 
time but which was conceived thousands of years ago and molded into what it is today 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). 
Over time, the study of decision-making has become one of multiple disciplines: 
mathematics, sociology, psychology, economics, political science, and philosophy 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). DoD program managers make complex decisions on a 
daily basis that span each of these disciplines. The methods by which decisions are made 
have evolved from consulting the Greek gods and the stars, to relying on the latest 
technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to facilitate the process (Buchanan & 
O’Connell, 2006). As we further understand the human factors associated with problem-
solving, risk mitigation, and the cognitive process, we will better understand the complex 
decision-making process (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). With the continued rapid 
evolution of technology, a program manager’s ability to make decisions in the future will 
become only more complex and convoluted as we become overly saturated with layers of 
information (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Human beings will continue to rely on such 
information technologies to make decisions because of the understanding of such theories 
as bounded rationality and to offset cognitive limits (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006).  
Possessing an understanding of the historical evolution of the decision-making 
process helped shape the direction in which we executed our research. The next several 
pages of our research introduce the reader to relevant topics such as sensemaking, analytic 
and intuitive decision-making, organizational and individual decision-making, and several 
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theories associated with each. We felt that understanding these areas of research would 
provide the requisite level of knowledge to gain an understanding of how program 
managers acquire insights into the decision-making process.  
C. SENSEMAKING  
We determined that understanding the subject of sensemaking was critical to the 
overall success and purpose of our research. It will help us to understand how sensemaking 
impacts the decision-making process within the DoD acquisition framework. Furthermore, 
it will allow us to better understand how program managers use sensemaking in complex 
environments to gain insight into the decision-making process. Sensemaking is an 
important aspect of decision-making because some decisions are made based on 
interpretation derived from sensemaking (Weick, 1995). The following paragraphs 
highlight relevant material written on the subject of sensemaking.  
Sensemaking has been an area of increased study and relevance since the turn of 
the 20th century. Theorists Harold Garfinkel and Karl Weick were among the first to 
introduce the term in the early 1960s (Maitlis & Christianson, 2003). Since then, the study 
of sensemaking has rapidly evolved. In the 1980s, studies were conducted to research the 
cognitive underpinnings of sensemaking and how the environment impacted decision-
making (Maitlis & Christianson, 2003). In the 1990s, studies were conducted to illuminate 
factors of sensemaking during times of crisis (Maitlis & Christianson, 2003). In the 2000s, 
the study of sensemaking has evolved to include the impact of sensemaking on 
organizations, and how the factors of power and emotions influence the process (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2003). As result of such in-depth study, several heuristic models exist today 
to help individuals and organizations navigate complexity and make better non-
programmed decisions.  
Defining the term sensemaking is an area of considerable debate. Some theorists 
describe sensemaking as a cognitive process, perspective, or model, while others describe 
it as a theory (Maitlis & Christianson, 2003). However, most theorists agree that 
“sensemaking has many distinct aspects—comprehending, understanding, explaining, 
attributing, extrapolating, and predicting.… What is common to these processes is that they 
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involve putting stimuli into frameworks that make sense of the stimuli” (Maitlis & 
Christianson, p. 62). Maitlis and Christianson (2003) extrapolated the definitions of over 
15 different theorists to define sensemaking as “a process, prompted by violated 
expectations, that involves attending to and bracketing cues in the environment, creating 
intersubjective meaning through cycles of interpretation and action, and thereby enacting 
a more ordered environment from which further cues can be drawn” (p. 67). Regardless of 
the definition, sensemaking is an important aspect worth studying to understand how DoD 
program managers make decisions.  
There are several characteristics associated with sensemaking. In his 1995 book, 
Sensemaking in Organizations, Karl E. Weick identifies seven characteristics of 
sensemaking: grounded in identity construction, retrospective, enactive of sensible 
environments, social, ongoing, focused on and by extracted cues, and driven by plausibility 
rather than accuracy. According to Weick (1995), “These seven characteristics serve as a 
rough guideline for inquiry into sensemaking in the sense that they suggest what 
sensemaking is, how it works, and where it can fail” (p. 18).  
Sensemaking generally leads to two different types of decisions: programmed and 
non-programmed. Programmed decisions are highly repetitive and require simple routine 
approaches to solving issues (Woehrle, 2011). For example, grabbing a bite to eat when 
hungry or changing a password on a computer are programmed decisions. On the other 
hand, non-programmed decisions are severely complex with ill-defined methods for 
determining a solution (Woehrle, 2011). Making programmatic decisions within an 
acquisition strategy for new disruptive technologies to counter hybrid, conventional, and 
non-state actor threats is an example of a non-programmed decision. The level of 
complexity, defined by the number of interacting agents, is much higher in non-
programmed decision-making than in programmed decision-making.  
DoD program managers make hundreds of decisions each day and live in a world 
that constantly fluctuates. Some decisions are more complicated than others and have 
greater consequences if incorrect. Several factors impact the decision-making process, 
including the ability to make structure amid ambiguity and to comprehend the operational 
environment—sensemaking. A program manager’s ability to be effective during the 
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decision-making process is dependent on understanding the social, political, legal, 
cognitive, and environmental factors of defense acquisition. At the core of the sensemaking 
process is the program manager’s desire to organize ambiguity and uncertainty into 
something comprehensible (Maitlis & Christianson, 2003). In theory, when program 
managers make sense of their environment, the act of making a decision becomes much 
easier. The next few pages of this research highlight two heuristic sensemaking models and 
how they might apply to a program manager’s decision-making process.  
D. CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK 
The Cynefin Framework facilitates the sensemaking process and helps leaders gain 
insight to the environment in which they are expected to make informed decisions. Figure 
2 presents an overview of the Cynefin Framework. It was created by David Snowden in 
1999 and offers a structure for leaders to identify a problem and catalog it in a domain and 
a method by which the problem can be approached (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Cynefin is 
considered a sensemaking model and not a categorization model (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). 
Therefore, as opposed to a categorization model, the data precedes the framework (Kurtz 
& Snowden, 2003). As a result, “the framework is used primarily to consider the dynamics 
of situations, decisions, perspectives, conflicts, and changes in order to come to a consensus 
for decision-making under uncertainty” (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). The Cynefin 
Framework can be a useful decision-making tool for many organization dealings with 
complex systems and when making non-programmed decisions. The Cynefin Framework 
is broken down into five domains and two environments: simple, complicated, complex, 
chaotic, and disordered domains, and the ordered and un-ordered environments (Snowden 
& Boone, 2007). Simple and complicated contexts fall under what Snowden considers an 
ordered environment, whereas complex and chaotic contexts fall under an un-ordered 
environment (Snowden & Boone, 2007). In an ordered environment, there is a correlation 
between cause and effect, and a distinction between what is known and what we must still 
learn to understand our environment, enabling problem-solvers to quickly apply technical 
skill and best practices to alleviate issues (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In an un-ordered 
environment, the link between cause and effect is complicated by the number of interacting 
entities or non-existent entities, which becomes more problematic for the decision-maker, 
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forcing him to regain control and analyze patterns in the environment to shape decisions 
(Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
 
Figure 2. Cynefin Framework. Source: Snowden and Boone (2007). 
Leaders in the DoD have created several heuristics and best practices, such as Better 
Buying Power, to abridge the complex acquisition system into the simple domain. The 
simple domain is characterized as the domain of best practices and standing operating 
procedures, because cause-and-effect relationships are well understood, and decisions in 
this domain are straightforward, obvious, and conditioned (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
Operating in the simple domain is ordered and the approach that one takes is to sense, 
categorize, and respond (Snowden & Boone, 2007). For example, a program manager 
would identify the problem (sense), categorize it, and then respond using an established 
best practice or SOP. As a result, problem-solving and decision-making in the simple 
domain require minor coordination with team members (Snowden & Boone, 2007). In the 
world of defense acquisition, office administrative functions, day-to-day operations, email 
correspondence, and the processing of paperwork are examples of operations in the simple 
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domain. Problem-solvers in this domain know what the effects of their actions will be 
before they are executed (Snowden & Boone, 2007).  
Because the world of defense acquisition is complex and strategic in nature, it 
requires a certain level of expertise and professionalism, specifically, Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III certification for product managers and 
above. Such expertise is required by problem-solvers who operate in the complicated 
domain of the Cynefin Framework (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The complicated domain is 
categorized as an ordered environment, and there is still a link between cause and effect, 
but it is not as strong as in the simple domain (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Operational 
outcomes in this domain are still predictable but require expertise to determine future 
actions (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The approach one takes in the complicated domain is 
to sense, analyze, and respond (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Problem-solvers in the 
complicated domain require technical expertise to identify the root cause of the issue, and 
apply good practice options, instead of best practice, to solve the issue while mitigating 
known risks in the process (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Consider a program manager 
tailoring the acquisition strategy to reduce the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction 
(TMRR) phase because the product has already achieved a technology readiness level 
(TRL) of 6, an example of operating in the complicated environment.  
Most major defense acquisition programs operate in the complex domain because 
the development of leap-ahead and disruptive technologies is complicated, the number of 
stakeholders involved is extraordinary, and the sheer number of constraints is cumbersome. 
Entering the complex domain is a shift into the unordered environment, and the correlation 
between cause and effect diminishes but can still be perceived through pattern analysis 
(Snowden & Boone, 2007). Problem-solvers in this domain cannot predict that an action 
will provide a favorable result but must work to understand unpredictable evolving patterns 
to gain insight into the situation (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Since problems in the complex 
domain are not linear in nature, experimentation is critical to identify positive outcomes 
and build on them (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The approach one takes in the complex 
domain is to probe, sense, and respond (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The objective is to 
“develop open-minded observation rather than hasty action based on preconceived ideas” 
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(Van Beurden, Kia, Zask, Dietrich, & Rose, 2011, p. 77). Technical expertise and 
established procedures alone will not solve problems that fall under the complex domain 
(Van Beurden et al., 2011). A high level of collaboration among stakeholders is required 
to overcome such issues (Van Beurden et al., 2011).  
Chaos ensues when the relationship between cause and effect is nonexistent and 
when order must be restored immediately (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). In the chaotic domain, 
the scope of the problem and root cause is  unknown, and there is no time for inaction or 
indecision (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). The approach the problem-solver must take is to act, 
sense, and respond (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Like stopping the bleeding by applying a 
tourniquet on a trauma patient, the first thing the problem-solver must do in the chaotic 
domain is to regain control, stability, and order (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). The chaotic 
domain is crisis management where order must be restored before analyzing patterns, 
applying technical expertise, and leveraging protocols to deal with an issue (Van Beurden 
et al., 2011). Restoring order amid chaos often requires an innovative problem-solving 
approach (Van Beurden et al., 2011). An example of this in defense acquisition would be 
a production line going down. In this event, the program manager must quickly act to turn 
the line back on and continue to operate in the complex and complicated domains resolving 
problems.  
At the center of the framework lies the domain of disorder. This domain is 
characterized by sheer confusion and competing perceptions of what domain the problem-
solver is operating in (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). A lack of cooperation exacerbates the 
problem when operating in the disordered domain, and biases cloud individual and 
collective judgment of the situation (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Differences in duty 
position, age, experience, and education level can perpetuate issues and prevent resolution, 
fueling a state of prolonged disorder. Because of such biases, people tend to fit problems 
into a domain space that they feel most comfortable operating within, but not necessarily 
the domain space to which the problem actually belongs (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). It is 
essential for decision-makers to come to an agreement to act to address the problem (Kurtz 
& Snowden, 2003).  
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The Cynefin Framework can be a highly effective sensemaking tool that helps 
program managers make sense of the environment to make informed decisions, while 
mitigating known risk. Using the framework as a sensemaking tool enables the problem-
solver to operate in a constant state of flux and measure the varying degree of complexity 
in the process (Van Beurden et al., 2011). It is best to operate in the complicated and 
complex domains because it fosters a culture of adaptation, creativity, flexibility, and 
emergent practices (Van Beurden et al., 2011). If operating too much in the simple domain, 
leaders become complacent, and if operating too much in the chaotic domain, leaders are 
most likely indecisive (Van Beurden et al., 2011). The worst-case scenario is when a 
problem crosses the boundary line from the simple domain directly to the chaotic domain, 
triggering crisis management that is difficult to apply due to the stagnation of operations 
in the simple domain (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Recovering from this situation requires 
not only creating order, but redesigning protocol, educating decision-makers to achieve a 
higher level of expertise, and changing the culture of an organization to become much more 
analytical (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). Utilizing the Cynefin Framework can help the 
problem-solver manage complexity and make decisions based off intuition and analytics. 
The next several paragraphs of research describe the difference between intuitive and 
analytical decision-making and highlight the importance of each on the process.  
E. INTUITIVE AND ANALYTICAL DECISION-MAKING 
Intuition is inevitably a part of the decision-making process that problem-solvers 
can either rely heavily on, choose to suppress, or a combination thereof. Intuition helps 
illuminate thought and emotion when operating in volatile, uncertain, complex, and 
ambiguous (VUCA) environments. However, we live in a highly analytical, scientific, 
process-oriented, and data-reliant world that frequently subdues gut feeling and intuition. 
Intuition can be defined as “a highly complex and highly developed form of reasoning that 
is based on years of experience and learning, and on facts, patterns, concepts, procedures 
and abstractions stored in one’s head” (Matzler, Bailom, & Mooradian, 2007). Intuition 
decision-making can then be defined as “affectively-charged judgements that arise through 
rapid, non-conscious, and holistic associations” (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2009, p. 188). 
Intuitive decision-making is a right-brain activity that places more emphasis on feeling and 
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emotion, instead of on process and data (Sauter, 1999). Analytical decision-making, on the 
other hand, is a left-brain activity and a more rational model that “consists of identifying 
and assessing decision-relevant information, evaluating costs and benefits, and ultimately 
making a decision through deliberation” (Dane et al., 2009, p. 188). An environment 
promoting rapid decision-making tends to be more conducive to intuitive decision-making, 
whereas a slow decision-making environment tends to be more conducive to analytical 
decision-making.  
Several factors influence the cultivation of intuitive decision-making. First, 
experience, age, and education have a drastic impact on the use and effectiveness of 
intuition. The longer a person lives, the more experiences a person has; the more 
experiences a person has, the more patterns a person observes; the more patterns a person 
observes, the better the intuition (Matzler et al., 2007). Those with a wealth of experience 
are “well equipped to capitalize on the potential benefits of intuition because they possess 
rich bodies of domain knowledge that foster the rapid and sophisticated associative 
processes that produce accurate intuitions” (Matzler et al., 2007). On the other hand, those 
with a novice level of knowledge and expertise are ill-suited to rely on the intuitive 
decision-making process and more likely to make misjudgments (Matzler et al., 2007). 
Research suggests that it takes roughly 10 years to acquire what experts call “domain-
specific expertise” to develop accurate intuitive judgments (Locke, 2015). However, 
studies have also proven that those with even a moderate level of domain expertise possess 
better intuitive decision-making skills when solving unconstructed problems than those 
who are novices (Dane et al., 2009).  
Effective intuitive decision-making is also heavily influenced by the virtue of 
emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence allows individuals to recognize, understand, 
and weaponize emotions to gain a competitive advantage and shape decision outcomes 
(Matzler et al., 2007). Those who have achieved domain expertise are typically more 
emotionally intelligent and willing to accept and mitigate risk (Matzler et al., 2007). 
Knowing when to rely on intuition and assume risk requires a comprehension of both the 
positive and negative impacts of the decision. Neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux “has proven 
that the amygdala—site in the brain of emotional memory—categorizes stimuli and 
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triggers behavior faster than cognitive process” (Matzler et al., 2007). Because emotions 
are processed faster than rational thought, cognitive discipline and patience are imperative 
when making intuitive decisions (Matzler et al., 2007). Emotional intelligence also helps 
establish decision risk tolerance. Peter Drucker once stated, “I believe in intuition only if 
you discipline it. The ‘hunch’ artists, the ones who make a diagnosis but don’t check it out 
with facts, with what they observe, are the ones who kill businesses” (Matzler et al., 2007).  
Not only do factors such as experience, age, and emotional intelligence cultivate 
the use of intuition, but so too does the type of environment and decision being made. 
Intuitive decision-making is more suitable when used in a time-constrained environment 
because it is a faster process than conducting detailed analysis (Locke, 2015). Analytical 
decision-making, on the other hand, is slower and more deliberate, requiring more time for 
in-depth analysis. In addition, intuitive decision-making is more suitable when used to 
solve unstructured problems (Locke, 2015). Unstructured problems “lack clear decision 
rules or [have] few objective criteria with which to make the decision” (Locke, 2015). 
These types of problems cannot be objectively solved using empirical processes and 
analytical data. On the other hand, a structured problem, such as a math problem, can be 
logically solved and verified for accuracy using an ordered process (Locke, 2015). 
Although not all decisions are purely analytical or intuitive,  
if there are clear decision rules that can be assessed with an algorithm, if 
relevant data are not available, and if the decision will be assessed with 
purely objective criteria (i.e., not aesthetic judgments or feelings), then an 
analytical approach is likely to be more helpful than intuition in reaching 
the best decision. (Locke, 2015)  
Intuition is less useful in solving structured problems and more useful when 
leveraged in unstructured environments.  
Leaders in all professions are expected to make informed decisions for the 
betterment of their organization. Many of the decisions they make are judgment calls in 
which they rely on both analytical data and intuition. Seasoned leaders with a high level of 
domain expertise are more capable of using intuition to “demonstrate good judgment and 
understand that judgment is a process, not an event” (Tichy & Bennis, 2007, p. 97). Noel 
Tichy and Warren Bennis captured the phases of the judgment process, as shown in Figure 
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3. Intuition is interwoven in the judgment process, which is conducted in three phases: the 
preparation phase, the call phase, and the execution phase (Tichy & Bennis, 2007). The 
preparation phase for making judgment calls is characterized by a leader’s ability to sense, 
frame, and align stakeholders (Tichy & Bennis, 2007). Intuition is best leveraged in this 
phase. Leaders with a high level of domain expertise rely on their experience and intuition 
to skillfully turn crisis into opportunity (Tichy & Bennis, 2007). As the decision-maker is 
sensing the environment, they are using their intuition to better understand their 
environment, identify the problem, and shape positive outcomes (Tichy & Bennis, 2007). 
As Tichy and Bennis (2007) noted, “Good leaders make a habit of sensing, framing, and 
aligning so that they are prepared for the call, which can arise at any moment” (p. 99). Vital 
to this process is using intuition based on domain expertise to influence the probability of 
a favorable outcome. The dichotomy between intuitive decision-making and analytical 
decision-making is further discussed in the next section where the Dual Process Theory is 
introduced.  
 
Figure 3. Judgment Process. Source: Tichy and Bennis (2007). 
F. DUAL PROCESS THEORY 
Program managers make hundreds of decisions each day ranging from simple to 
complex. The different cognitive processes used to make fast or slow decisions has been 
studied by psychologists for years. The dual process theory suggests that humans use two 
distinct and competing processes of thinking when making decisions. Psychologists Keith 
Stanovich and Richard West refer to these as System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman, 2012). 
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System 1 relies more on emotion and is considered intuitive, whereas System 2 relies more 
on cognitive thought and is considered analytical and rational (Kahneman, 2012). Figure 4 
highlights the dual process theory and the interaction between System 1 and System 2. 
Understanding this topic is critical to our research because it will allow us to identify how 
program managers make decisions in the acquisition environment.  
 
Figure 4. Dual Process Theory. Source: Kahneman (2012). 
System 1 is characterized as intuitive, fast, effortless, and automatic (Kahneman, 
2012). System 1 decisions rely less on cognitive thought and more on gut instinct and 
emotion (Kahneman, 2012). Humans rely on System 1 to make simple decisions each day. 
For example, we use System 1 to decide what to eat, what to wear, and what route to drive 
to our place of work. The decisions made are generally less complex and unstructured. 
According to Kahneman (2012), System 1 “effortlessly originates impressions and feelings 
that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2” (p. 
122). 
System 2 is characterized as deliberate, slow, analytical, and voluntary (Kahneman, 
2012). This system operates in a sequential manner and is known to be rational (Kahneman, 
2012). System 2 is primarily used to solve complex structured problems, such as math 
equations, that are rule-based. To solve such issues, more time is required than with System 
1. According to Kahneman (2012), System 2 “is the conscious, reasoning self that has 
beliefs, makes choices and decides what to think about and what to do” (p. 122). 
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Understanding the difference between System 1 and System 2 will help us understand the 
cognitive process of NDM. In the following sections, we examine the NDM process and 
different approaches to understanding how individuals use intuition to solve complex 
problems.  
G. NATURALISTIC DECISION-MAKING  
Understanding how program managers make decisions based on sensemaking or 
intuition when faced with complex problems is significant to our research. Secondly, being 
able to identify the many naturalistic environments that affect the acquisition decision-
making process will further shape our interpretation of program manager’s decision 
process. NDM is the cognitive ethnographic understanding of how people make decisions 
in a real-world setting (Klein, 2008). NDM research begun in the early 1980s, where 
studies focused on a certain population of leaders ranging from firefighters, military 
commanders, nurses, design engineers, and pilots (Klein, 2016). The study examined the 
kinds of decisions and problem sets leaders were faced with within their own career fields 
and how they used their past experiences to manage challenging conditions. These 
challenging conditions consisted of wicked problem sets like time pressure, uncertainty, 
conflicting goals, experience, high stakes, multiple players, dynamic settings, and 
organizational constraints (Klein, 2016). Understanding how each variable can affect one’s 
cognitive ability to rapidly categorize ill-defined problems and make an effective decision 
is an important factor in understanding the NDM framework (Klein, 2008). Figure 5 




Figure 5. Characteristics of Naturalistic Environments. 
Source: Simpson (2001). 
H. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATURALISTIC DECISION-MAKING  
Time pressure can be defined as a psychological stress that occurs when an 
individual is faced with less time than necessary to complete a task (Davis, 2016). Time 
pressures are divided into two categories, low time pressures and high time pressures 
(Davis, 2016). Low time pressures require less demand for an individual to make a rapid 
decision. The individual faced with making either a simple or complex decision is 
operating in a more controlled environment where time is readily available for a leader to 
mentally process different courses of action. Though low time pressure allows for more 
flexibility when dealing with problems, it becomes extremely difficult when handling 
rapidly changing conditions (Klein & Klinger, 2015). High time pressures are more rigid, 
less flexible conditions that usually are not conducive to group-type thinking or course of 
action development due to time constraints. Military leaders, especially special forces 
types, operate regularly within high time–pressured environments. Environments that are 
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high pressured usually require a rapid decision response and are complex and difficult to 
categorize.  
Uncertainty, ambiguity, and missing data are all contributing factors that influence 
the NDM process (Klein & Klinger, 2015). Uncertainty or poor understanding of the 
problem set can introduce complexity into the decision-making process. If the situation is 
unfamiliar or hard to define, the individual is forced to reassess and seek more information 
(Klein & Klinger, 2015). From a program manager’s perspective, informational delays not 
only impact the ability to implement a decision, but could also negatively affect the cost, 
schedule, and performance of a military system. Another example that could lead to 
ambiguity or confusion is the shifting or competing of other goals (Klein & Klinger, 2015).  
The need to accomplish competing goals puts pressure on the individual and 
organization to balance which decision or action is best to implement (Stroh, 2018). 
According to D. P. Stroh (2018), an expert in systems thinking, it is impossible to satisfy 
both goals at once, and if attempted, the organization will achieve one objective at the 
expense of the other. Trying to achieve both goals simultaneously can be difficult and 
counterproductive (Stroh, 2018). The end results can include poor productivity, 
miscommunication, resource abuse, and a decision that could produce a failed outcome. 
One’s experience can influence their ability to handle complex situations and make 
rapid decisions. Klein’s (2008) research on NDM discovered that people tend to rely on 
prior experiences to rapidly categorize situations. The experienced decision-maker’s 
outcomes are still successful only if they choose their first course of action (Klein, 1993). 
His research identified the notion that individuals go through some kind of synthesis of 
their experiences to make sense of complex situations (Klein, 2008). The idea that decision-
making falls under a domain-independent approach quickly transitions to a knowledge-
based approach that supports one’s experience (Klein, 2008). From this knowledge-based 
approach, the decision-making process would incorporate a new model that would help 
further define how an individual’s ability to relate back to a prior experience was based on 
perception and recognition of patterns (Klein, 2008). The recognition-primed decision 
(RPD) model illustrates how people can use their experience to identify patterns when 
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making a decision (Klein, 2008). Once patterns are identified, the individual can formulate 
a response by analyzing past experiences or lessons learned.  
Organizational constraints are a significant contributing element for introducing 
conflict into a recognitional decision strategist (RDS) environment. Organizational 
aspirations may complicate the decision-making process (Simpson, 2001). By creating 
constraints due to organizational policies, stakeholder management, or competing goals, 
the RDS’s decision-making process becomes limited. Organizational constraints in the 
work environment can also hinder an individual’s ability to be creative or flexible during 
the decision-making process. These constraints are usually based on how the decision-
making process is disrupted or shaped by either the organization’s culture or needs. In the 
next section, we provide an overview of the organizational decision-making process.  
I. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
Understanding how organizational constraints can impact the program manager’s 
decision-making process is vital to our research. Organizational decision-making is another 
process that each program manager must comprehend in order to be successful within the 
current acquisition environment. Organizational decision-making is the cognitive process 
where an individual is confronted with either a programmed or non-programmed decision 
that has some form of effect within their organization. Both programmed and non-
programmed decisions are critical factors that influence the organizational decision-
making environment. Programmed decisions are highly repetitive, simple routine 
approaches to solving issues, while non-programmed decisions are severely complex or 
unique with no specific method for determining an approach to the solution (Woehrle, 
2011). Carnegie, incremental, and garbage can models accurately illustrate the sequence of 
events when the individual is subjected to both organizational programmed and non-
programmed decisions.  
The Carnegie model was developed by Richard Cyert, James March, and Herbert 
Simon, all from Carnegie Mellon University (Daft, 2010). The model was designed to 
explain how the bounded rationality approach affects the individual during the 
organizational decision-making process (Daft, 2010). Bounded rationality is tied to limited 
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understanding or mental capacity to process complex information or problem sets. The 
Carnegie model takes in consideration of uncertainty and conflict to create a course of 
action during non-programmed decisions with both political and social factors (Daft, 
2010). 
The incremental decision-making model was developed by Henry Mintzberg and 
associates at McGill University (Daft, 2010). The model would support a structured 
sequence of events from identifying one issue to creating a single solution to implement 
(Daft, 2010). The incremental model is a simplistic approach to handling both programmed 
and non-programmed decisions without adding political or social factors that are similar to 
the Carnegie model (Daft, 2010). The incremental approach is designed for decision-
making traceability back to the recognition of the problem to help identify what steps were 
taken for course of action development (Daft, 2010). 
The garbage can model is unlike both the Carnegie and incremental decision 
models because it accounts for multiple variables that influence the decision-making 
process. The garbage can model deals with multiple decisions within a particular 
organization during moments of high uncertainty (Daft, 2010). The model supports the 
theory that decisions in large organizations can become erratic and spontaneous, creating 
a non-programmed decision-making environment (Daft, 2010). The garbage can model has 
relevance within the DoD and must be strongly considered when analyzing robust 
organizations during the decision-making process. In the next section, Klein’s RPD model 
is explored in more depth. Klein’s RPD model introduces a few organizational decision-
making elements to illustrate how a certain institution can create expectations or goals that 
can potentially alter one’s ability to implement action.  
J. KLEIN’S RPD MODEL  
As previously noted, the purpose of the RPD model is to explain how rapid 
decisions are made in a complex environment (Klein, 1993). Figure 6 explains the mental 
sequence of decision-making because of an ill-defined problem set. The first step of the 
process is pattern analysis recognition by using past experiences to bridge relevant cues, 
goals, and expectancies. The second step is formulating actions off those recognition 
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patterns that will help transition to mental simulation of what actions need to take place. 
The third step is using intuition and experience to determine whether the selected course 
of action will be effective. The final step is implementation of the decision. The RPD 
Model illustrates how an individual can make a decision based off a single course of action 
through mental simulation (Klein, 1993). It is not intended to work for everyone though; 
the model seems to work best with decision-makers who are accustomed to operating in 
high time pressures associated with complex environments (Klein, 1993). Therefore, the 
RPD model can support recognitional decision strategists (RDS) who are familiar with 
managing dynamic operational environments (Klein, 1993). Unlike Klein’s RPD model, 
Rasmussen’s theory on decision-making focuses on addressing the different environments 
that can influence an individual’s approach to solving problems. Rasmussen’s decision 
process is discussed in more depth in the next section.  
 
Figure 6. Klein’s RPD Model. Source: Klein (1993). 
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K. RASMUSSEN’S DECISION PROCESSES 
Rasmussen’s theory on human performance explains the decision-making process 
in both routine and unfamiliar task environments (Rasmussen, 1983). He categorizes 
human performance into three types of behavior: skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-
based (Rasmussen, 1983). 
Skill-based behavior is associated with routine tasks that are simple or perceived as 
“second-natured” events that is supported by sensory-motor performance (Rasmussen, 
1983). All skill-based behaviors are subconscious efforts to make sense or navigate through 
the decision-making environment. An example would be breathing or any other human 
activity that requires no conscious attention or control (Rasmussen, 1983). Skill-based 
behaviors can easily transition to actions with minimal thought or pattern recognition.  
Rule-based behavior is controlled by a well-known procedure or policy that has 
been derived from a previous occasion or an event (Rasmussen, 1983). This type of 
behavior is commonly seen in familiar work environments where the individual is 
confident and understands the problem set. An example would be a program manager 
adhering to the DoD Instruction 5000.2, the program manager’s acquisition guidebook for 
all program-related decisions. The transition from rule-based behavior into skill-based 
behavior will be dependent on a person’s level of training and attention to mastering their 
craft. 
Knowledge-based environments fall under unfamiliar decision-making 
environments where skill-based and rule-based behaviors do not apply (Rasmussen, 1983). 
The goal for knowledge-based environments is to make sense of ill-problem sets that will 
later aid course of action development. A lot of the “mental” actions are tested through trial 
and error until there is a solid understanding of what the outcomes of the decision will be 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Examples of knowledge-based environments will all depend on the 
tacit knowledge and expertise of the individual undergoing the decision-making process.  
L. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter summarized a variety of relevant literature written about decision-
making, specifically, individual and organizational decision-making. The purpose of the 
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chapter was to provide a baseline review of literature written on the topic and not an 
exhaustive review. It highlighted several decision-making and sensemaking models 
developed by some of the world’s most well-known psychologists. Chapter III illuminates 
the data, facts, and findings from our research with two ACAT I Army program managers.  
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III. DATA 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to disclose the results of the data collected during our 
research. On August 10, 2018, we interviewed two Army program managers in the rank of 
colonel, both of whom manage Acquisition Category 1 (ACAT 1) programs in Huntsville, 
AL. The purpose remained to recognize how a program manager gains insight into the 
decision-making process in complex and sometimes chaotic environments. For the sake of 
safeguarding personally identifiable information, the interviewees’ names and acquisition 
program are not revealed in this summary. We refer to the first interviewee as “Subject A” 
and the second interviewee as “Subject B.” We refer to their programs simply as ACAT 1 
programs. Both interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed for ease of analysis by 
the research team. Figure 7 provides an upfront snapshot of the analytic codes and 
categories that were derived from the data gathered from both subjects. As themes began 
to emerge throughout the interviews, they were put into the 21 second-order analytic codes 
and later categorized into six aggregate categories displayed in Figure 7. This chapter 
reveals the results of that coding and categorization.  
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Figure 7. Analytic Codes, Categories, and Applications 
B. SUBJECT A—INTERVIEW SUMMARY  
On August 10, 2018, we conducted an interview with Subject A, who is a program 
manager for an Army Category 1D program, which exceeds $480 million in research, 
development, technology, and engineering (RDT&E) and $2.79 billion in procurement 
throughout the system’s life-cycle cost. We asked Subject A to explain a time when his 
program experienced difficulty and to tell us a story about how he dealt with such issues. 
We also asked Subject A to frame the current acquisition environment and how he gains 
insight into the decision-making process when dealing with complex situations. The 
questions we asked were intentionally open-ended, allowing the subject to describe and 
explain his decision-making process from his individual experience. What we discovered 
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were certain trends associated with both analytical and naturalistic decision-making 
principles.  
Figure 8 depicts the analytic codes that formed the basis for the aggregate categories 
based on the data gathered from Subject A. The analytic codes were established from 
information themes discussed by Subject A during the interview process. Figure 9 depicts 
the number of times Subject A referred to a specific category. The data shows that 
environmental factors and consensus-making had the most influence on Subject A’s 
decision-making process. Sensemaking, trust, and tacit knowledge were virtually equal, 
while explicit knowledge was the least occurring factor impacting Subject A’s decision-
making process. This data is further extrapolated in the next several paragraphs. 
 
Figure 8. Subject A Analytic Codes and Categories  
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Figure 9. Subject A Categorical Interview Data  
1. Sensemaking 
Subject A referred to sensemaking eight times during the interview. The analytic 
codes derived from Subject A that form the category sensemaking include pattern 
recognition, prioritization, and organization. Subject A described the evolution of his 
current program, stating that it had been “basically an 18-year developmental program.” 
Subject A referred to his program in this manner because the program had been cancelled, 
renamed, and reinitiated several times over the course of nearly two decades. Subject A 
was very introspective during the interview and demonstrated a keen awareness of past 
programmatic patterns and highlighted the importance of such patterns to make future 
programmatic decisions. Subject A described signs and symptoms of potential future 
programmatic difficulties. Based on intuition and past experiences, Subject A was able to 
sense potential issues early by understanding patterns and organizing the information to 
shape future decision-making. Subject A stated,  
I think a lot of where I saw potential disconnects were gut feeling where you 
had experiences that told you that okay, if they are asking me what would 
happen if we slip this another three or four months, or if I cut you a little 
bit, what would the impact be? I used to refer to it as you give a program 
cancer. That’s when you see the budget guys looking for something, they 
start to nibble at it, and they give the program cancer and it just takes a slow, 
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slow death to finally happen. When you start seeing that, you have got to 
force it to make the decision. 
When program funding was cut or when the requirement changed, Subject A 
organized the data and solved the problem by setting new priorities with the user 
community, given new constraints. Subject A stated, 
You prioritize with the user community and then we’ll work with them to 
understand what the cost associated with the different gaps that they want 
to pursue, what they are, and how they want to prioritize them. So, we’re 
really impartial to who gives us a requirement and who gives us the money, 
as long as I get both, I can go do what we need to do. 
Subject A’s reference to using his gut feeling, his reference to organization and 
pattern recognition, and his reference to prioritization became analytic codes that formed 
the sensemaking category.  
2. Consensus-Making  
During the interview, Subject A referred to consensus-making 11 times. The 
analytic codes derived from Subject A that form the category of consensus-making include 
stakeholder alignment, education, and synchronization. Subject A thoroughly described the 
importance of stakeholder management and stakeholder alignment. In the process, Subject 
A shared an analogy of the DoD acquisition process that he labeled as the “bus driver 
theory”:  
I had a great boss … and she had an analogy of acquisition being a school 
bus and it’s a unique school bus where there’s one driver that had the 
steering wheel and that was the PM, but everybody in the back of the bus 
had a brake, and so you get that visual that everybody can stop you, and yet 
you’re the one stuck driving this thing, and that’s the decision-making 
process—good explanation of the decision-making process because you’ve 
got to get them all on board. 
The bus driver theory concisely summarizes the importance of identifying key 
stakeholders, managing stakeholder perception of the program, and creating shared 
understanding among stakeholders. Subject A’s reference to getting everyone on board was 
coded as stakeholder alignment and easily fits into the consensus-making category.  
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Subject A continued the discussion on stakeholder management and alignment by 
stressing the importance of consensus-making. It is the job of the program manager to 
champion his or her program from the day the charter is assumed to the day the charter is 
passed on. In the process, the program manager must influence stakeholder perception of 
the program. Influencing decisions as an acquisition professional means synchronizing 
perceptions of senior leaders and the ground user alike. Subject A stated, 
Regardless of whether you’re out in a company, battalion, brigade, or you’re 
in acquisition job here working through to the Army staff and through 
ASALT, the higher you get in grade, the less direct influence you have over 
the people who work for you. That’s particularly our case in acquisition 
because our direct chain and our influence is very, very narrow, but it goes 
all the way from the top of the senior leadership of the Army, down to, you 
know, where the rubber meets the road with the warfighter, but it’s in a very 
narrow band. Knowing when to get the stakeholders involved at the different 
levels is the part that I think, you know, I fell back on when I decide, hey, 
this is where we need to kind of get into some decision-making process of 
who we need to engage, because we do have the ability to affect, or have 
access to people at the very, very top because we’re always getting asked 
to come in there, and that’s who holds the decisions for us to move forward. 
Every budget decision, you know, the secretary and the chief are the only 
ones that really approve budget decisions for the Army. 
Subject A’s reference to knowing when to get stakeholders involved and his 
reference to the narrowness of the chain of command were coded as stakeholder alignment 
and synchronization, both of which fit easily in the consensus-making category.  
Subject A described the importance and uniqueness of stakeholder alignment and 
consensus-making in the acquisition environment. He described how decision-making in 
the acquisition environment is very different from the operational environment because of 
decision-making authority. As he alluded to in his earlier statement, Subject A described 
the difficulty in synchronizing efforts due to the narrowness of the chain of command. 
Subject A stated,  
The actual execution of getting stakeholder … consensus on decisions, 
that’s something that is a little bit different than I think the way you would 
see operational decisions being made. Most of our experiences in the 
operational Army, we have a little bit more direct authority and we could 
force decisions and quite honestly, we know all of the factors at those levels 
that we are capable of making those decisions. A lot of our decisions in 
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acquisition are so complex because of the narrowness of our chain of 
command and because top line Army decisions may impact what you are 
doing.  
Subject A’s reference to the narrowness of the chain of command once again 
highlights the importance of stakeholder alignment and the synchronization of stakeholders 
for the overall success of acquisition programs.  
Subject A described the art and science of program management. In doing so, he 
described the acquisition process as the science, and activities such as stakeholder 
management, the art. Subject A stated,  
I think process is the science behind how we do it. The art is in how you 
deal with those stakeholders to get it through. I think that’s where the gut 
feeling of who you need to get influenced—again with our structure, we can 
steamroll people just because we quickly go to the top. The other part is we 
can quickly get steamrolled. So, you have got to be careful in how you play 
that card. 
Subject A described one of the roles of the program manager, which is educator. 
Subject A explained that the program manager must educate decision-makers on risk areas 
and how they impact cost, schedule, and performance. Subject A stated,  
If they are doubting the requirement … I think that is when you need to 
push, are you sure you understand fully where this thing fits into the Army 
doctrine? If they say, yes, we got it, we understand what not doing this 
program will do, or we know what you know, slowing it down will do based 
off of threat evolution and threat vectors and they are willing to accept that, 
then it’s an informed decision, go home, sleep well at night. If you haven’t 
done the right job of going and informing those folks and they make an 
uninformed decision, then a year later they come back and say, wait a 
minute, you didn’t tell me about this impact, well—sorry.” 
Subject A’s reference to informing was coded as educating and fits in the category 
of consensus-making.  
3. Trust 
During the interview, Subject A referred to trust seven times. The analytic codes 
derived from Subject A that form the category trust include reliability, credibility, and 
empowerment. As described earlier, several stakeholders have influence over DoD 
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acquisition programs. It is the program manager’s responsibility to manage cost, schedule, 
and performance of acquisition programs in order to provide the warfighter with the best 
instruments of war. Accomplishing such a task requires trust among stakeholders, 
empowerment of acquisition professionals to make decisions, and credibility and reliability 
of all leaders influencing the program. During the interview, Subject A hinted at there being 
a lack of trust between DoD program managers and the MDAP decision-makers. Subject 
A stated, 
When the Army sets a priority and is committed to something, if you get 
behind, our natural instinct is to question why you’re behind and to 
potentially raid that program, because we smell blood in the water and 
everybody wants to take the funds from it, rather than say, hey, you’re 
behind, we need to apply more resources, we need to fix the problem 
because this is an Army priority. We shouldn’t club the guy while he’s 
down, but fix it. When the bus gets a flat tire, change the tire and keep 
moving, but don’t look for a new bus, and that’s what we’ve historically 
done with a lot of our programs. 
Subject A’s reference to clubbing while down, fixing the flat tire on the bus, and 
raiding a program of funds implies that there is a lack of trust and empowerment between 
the program manager and the operational force and decision-makers that needs to be 
changed.  
The Army must trust the program manager to make programmatic decisions, but 
often, program managers spend more time educating, aligning, and managing stakeholders. 
Once a requirement is set, and resources are allocated, the program manager must display 
competence in program execution, must be given trust and responsibility to lead, and must 
be supported by leadership in order to succeed. However, decision-making authority is held 
at the highest levels with the DoD and is out of the program manager’s hands. Subject A 
illuminated trust, credibility, and micro-management issues in the following statement:  
You [the user] own the requirements, you tell me what you want me to go 
get you, and I will get it for you. I am not married to it, but if you start seeing 
them poke around asking questions from different perspectives, it probably 
means that they are doubting the requirement. Or the priority of the 
requirement in the big scheme of things. 
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Remaining neutral to requirements allows the program manager to separate 
emotions from management and better influence decisions on cost, schedule, and 
performance. Subject A explained the importance of the charter when making complex 
decision that impact multi-service programs. He also highlighted the importance of trust in 
the acquisition process when he referenced a handshake deal with the Army or other 
services. Subject A stated,  
The decision-making process has to be rooted in whatever your charter is. 
So, if you’ve got a charter that says I’m going to execute this program, and 
I’ve got an acquisition program baseline that I’ve said I need this much 
money to deliver this capability whenever that is changed, whether it’s you 
screwed up the acquisitions strategy and, you know, you’re behind schedule 
and you’re over budget, or they want to change something on there, that is 
your handshake with the Army, and potentially other services if you’ve got 
a program like some of mine that are multi-service. That’s when you have 
to get into that, okay, now what is the way to get us back out of this hole 
and when do I need to ask for help. 
4. Tacit Knowledge 
Subject A referred to tacit knowledge seven times during the interview. The 
analytic codes derived from Subject A that form the category tacit knowledge include 
experience, creativity, and cognitive ability. Subject A demonstrated a reliance on his past 
experiences in acquisition to shape future decision-making. Subject A referenced his 
experience in acquisition by highlighting that he has over a decade of experience in the 
field. He referenced how experience, creativity and cognitive ability were important by 
stating, 
I think a lot of understanding where I saw potential disconnects were gut 
feelings where I had experiences that told me that if they are asking me what 
would happen if we slip this another three or four months, or if I cut you a 
little bit, what would the impact be?  
Subject A’s reference to utilizing his gut feeling to understand potential 
disconnects, his reference to his experience, and his reference to providing counsel based 
on changes to resources or requirements were coded as experience and cognitive ability 
and categorized under tacit knowledge.  
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Subject A further explained why tacit knowledge was important to gain insight into 
the decision-making process. Subject A explained how tacit knowledge and past 
experience help a program manager identify key stakeholders to engage. Subject A stated, 
“Knowing when to get the stakeholders involved at the different levels is what I fell back 
on when we needed to get into the decision-making.” This statement was coded as 
experience and creativity and falls into the tacit knowledge category.  
Subject A contradicted the importance of tacit knowledge and past experiences 
when he stated, “Your experiences don’t necessarily prepare you 100% for how to best get 
things done.” However, in making this statement, Subject A was referring to the difficulties 
of consensus-making and how past experiences don’t prepare program managers for this 
process. In addition, Subject A stated that the higher leaders get in grade, the less direct 
influence they have over the people who work for them. 
5. Explicit Knowledge 
During the interview, Subject A referred to explicit knowledge five times. The 
analytic codes derived from Subject A that form the category of explicit knowledge include 
data, process, and policy. Data refers to specific information, figures, or statistics, such as 
test and evaluation criteria, used in program management to make decisions. Process and 
policy refer to the defense acquisition systems and the laws, rules, and regulations 
associated with acquisition. Subject A explained the difference between “big A” and “little 
A” acquisition. He stated,  
As soon as you sign up as a product manager, to program manager, to take 
some amount of resources, to deliver some amount of capability, then it 
becomes a “little A” problem, and think that’s where we struggle with 
pushing back on the requirements or the resourcing folks to make sure that 
when we do take ownership of that, we can execute it. 
When subject A referred to “little A” acquisition, he was referring to the processes 
and policies associated with program management. This was coded as policy and process 
and falls under the category of explicit knowledge.  
Subject A went on to describe the defense acquisition management system (DAMS) 
and how it impacts the program manager’s ability to make decisions. The DAMS is a 
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process characterized by a series of processes, events, and milestone decisions to manage 
the life cycle of future and emerging systems. Subject A stated,  
We only have got one process. You can hate the process all you want, but 
it’s the one we got, and there’s ways to make it work. So, you will see a 
couple of different camps of acquisition guys. Those that will just complain 
about the process and try to, you know, use it as a scapegoat for why things 
are going slow or why they can or can’t do things. Then, there are others 
that try to work with it and do the best they can. 
Subject A’s reference to the process and his reference to those who work within the 
process and make the most out of it were coded as process and policy. We believe that 
when Subject A referred to working within the system that he meant staying legally 
adherent but navigating the rules to provide the best capability quickly.  
6. Environmental Factors 
During the interview, Subject A referred to environmental factors 20 times. The 
analytic codes derived from Subject A that form the environmental category include the 
budget, requirements, and operational culture. This was by far the most referred-to category 
during the interview with Subject A and is an essential element that merits research to fully 
understand how a program manager gains insight into the decision-making process. When 
describing the biggest challenges he has faced, Subject A described how the budget and 
requirements impact the acquisition environment. He stated,  
The biggest challenge I think that any acquisition manager is going to run 
in to, is we aren’t going to have consistent budgeting, we aren’t going to 
have stable funding profiles, and we’re always going to have a user with an 
insatiable appetite for new requirements, and that’s fine, but when you make 
that handshake agreement with them, that, hey, I’m going to deliver this 
product, you then can’t let them change the funding or the requirements 
without getting their buy-in on the impact to program. 
Subject A reiterated the fact that program managers must remain impartial to 
requirements. Subject A describes how his current program has been impacted by 
environmental factors. He stated that his program experienced funding cuts and 
cancellation over the past 18 years because of presidential budget decision 753, the focus 
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on counterinsurgency and changing requirements and because of sequester. Subject A 
describes the profound impact of environmental issues by stating,  
We finished up the program that we had started 18 years ago this past spring, 
and it’s an incredible capability to give to the war fighter, but if we stayed 
the course early on and provided that consistency, we likely would’ve 
finished it well ahead of time, and probably a lot cheaper than the full 
program costs us today. 
Subject A went on to describe the pressure that program managers face when 
influencing complex decisions. Subject A described how it is difficult to empower 
acquisition professionals and how at times, acquisition professionals are reluctant to accept 
empowerment when it is presented to them. Subject A described the struggle between 
leadership and charter by stating,  
It’s very, very hard to empower acquisition people. Acquisition people were 
very reluctant to accept empowerment or take that and say okay, I have got 
a charter, I am going to go and make these decisions. We all talk a tough 
game, but when it comes to push comes to shove, am I going to not do what 
the PEO wants me to do? Or am I going to fall back on my charter and tell 
the requirements guys, no, you are not changing your requirement? I got 
this, I am going to go and do this. But I think ours is, because of the 
consensus-building part, your experiences don’t necessarily prepare you 
100% for how to best get that done. 
Subject A alludes to the struggle between the charter and the environment. He 
makes it clear that at times, acquisition professionals become complacent or cede their 
authority by stating that it is very hard to empower them.  
C. SUBJECT B—INTERVIEW SUMMARY 
We conducted an interview with Subject B who is a program manager for an Army 
Category 1D level program exceeding $480 million in RDT&E and $2.79 billion in 
procurement throughout the system’s life-cycle cost. We asked Subject B to explain a time 
when his program experienced difficulty and to tell us a story about how he dealt with such 
issues. We also asked Subject B to frame the current acquisition environment and how he 
gains insight into the decision-making process when dealing with complex situations. The 
questions we asked were intentionally open-ended, allowing the subject to describe and 
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explain his decision-making process from his individual experience. What we discovered 
were certain trends or patterns associated with both analytical and NDM principles. 
Figure 10 depicts the analytic codes that formed the basis for the aggregate 
categories based on the data gathered from Subject B. Figure 11 depicts the number of 
times Subject B referred to a specific category. The data shows that consensus-making and 
environmental factors had the most influence over Subject B’s decision-making process, 
while sensemaking, trust, and explicit knowledge were all equal but less frequent. Tacit 
knowledge was the least occurring factor that affected Subject B’s decision-making 
process. 
 
Figure 10. Subject B Analytic Codes and Categories 
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Figure 11. Subject B Categorical Interview Data  
1. Consensus-Making  
During the interview with Subject B, consensus-making elements were identified 
nine different times. The analytic codes derived from Subject B that form the consensus-
making category include stakeholder management, educating, and showcasing. Subject B 
described the importance of creating a stakeholder matrix to better understand which 
individual can be influenced through a consensus-making approach. Subject B stated, I’m 
doing it because I have no idea who my stakeholders are. Subject B’s reference to the 
stakeholder matrix highlight the importance of identifying stakeholders and having a plan 
to gain their consensus on the program when needed.  
Subject B described a moment of uncertainty among several senior military leaders 
who articulated doubt about how the program was progressing during its early 
developmental stage of the life cycle. This newly discovered confusion with certain key 
senior military officers shaped the conditions for possible program termination. Subject B 
reacted to this difficult, sensitive situation by seeking out individuals who openly expressed 
doubt about the program and educating them on the capabilities the system would provide 
for the warfighter. The following quote highlights stakeholder alignment and education. 
Subject B explained, 
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General X was swinging through Huntsville earlier this week, for the space 
and missile defense symposium, and he wanted an hour with each of the 
programs here, just to kind of understand them. And, when I sat down with 
him, he said, “Why on earth would you continue this contract with?” So, I 
knew, out of the gate, you know, where his head was at, right? Over the 
course of an hour, he totally did a 180, he completely got it, he understood 
that if we don’t do this, we’re delaying this capability nine years, another 
$2 billion, and that the folks that are championing this, hey let’s just 
upgrade this Patriot thing, they really don’t understand the complexity 
involved with that, and they’re getting a bill of goods from that vendor. 
Subject B explained the importance of showcasing the system’s capabilities 
by providing situational awareness through media sources. Every time the 
system went through a critical milestone, Subject B made an effort to 
continually build confidence with the user community. An example of this 
was when Subject B was describing past efforts on the Joint Air-to-Ground 
Missile Program (JAGM): We’ve done like these five soldier check out 
events in the last year and a half. There was some ugly, but there was also 
some good. Put out a couple press releases. So, they recently have done that. 
We did it a lot on the program—every time we awarded something, every 
time we shot something, you know, hey, let’s go to the press, and we’ll 
remind them that we’re still here and we’re doing good stuff. 
2. Environment  
Environmental factors were another instrumental element that impacted Subject 
B’s decision-making process. During the course of the interview, environmental elements 
were discussed over seven times. The analytic codes derived from Subject B that form the 
environmental category consisted of budget concerns, user requirements, and the Army’s 
organizational culture. Subject B simply explained how the budget process works and how 
the program manager has limited influence on the overall cost of the system. Subject B 
quickly referred to the acquisition budget process when stating, 
Well, cost is what it is. You’re kind of in a box, and it’s hard to ask for 
money. It’s not impossible, I mean, we do it every fall, and anytime we’ve 
needed money, if you have support, and you have the user going, “Yeah, I 
need that!” you’ll probably get your money.  
User requirements are derived from operational gaps identified when comparing 
military capabilities against a well-known enemy threat. Requirements are the key essential 
element that the acquisition management process is built upon. Subject B alluded to this 
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fact when describing the important role that requirements and capability gaps play during 
system development. This was made evident when Subject B stated, 
So, figuring out who the stakeholders are and making sure that they 
understand what you’re trying to say, and you’re not being biased, you 
know, I think I opened this with, if the requirements and the capability gaps 
didn’t exist, then I wouldn’t be championing this program, I’d say cancel it. 
I mean, I’m early enough they’ll find me another job, you know, I’m not 
worried about that. 
Subject B explained the current culture within the Army and how it is impacting 
the decision-making process for weapon system development. Subject B talked about how 
a simple routine contracting modification was being stalled due to awaiting approval from 
a certain senior leader. Traditionally, this particular senior leader has never gotten involved 
in matters like system-level contracting. According to Subject B, the recent shift within the 
Army’s culture has ignited this new drive for acquisition management—what could be 
considered disruptive towards the overall acquisition process. 
So, just this morning, we were in a meeting with the undersecretary of the 
Army asking to award a contract modification. Nothing that I would have 
ever have asked permission before in the past before. But the secretary of 
the Army himself has said that there should be no actions on that program 
until I approve it, so we’ve been pending this award of this modification 
since January. I think that it’s a tough environment to work in—an ACAT 1 
program manager should never be waiting on the secretary of the Army 
who’s not even anywhere in my chain to award a modification to a 
contractor, that I’ve been budgeted for, that Congress has given me the 
money for, that’s been in all of my R forms, that type of thing. 
3. Sensemaking  
Subject B’s ability for sensemaking was a major factor that shaped the NDM 
process when dealing with complex problems that affected the program’s progression. 
Throughout the interview, sensemaking elements were discussed only two times. The 
analytic codes derived from Subject B that form the sensemaking category include 
simplification of complex problems and prioritization of efforts. Subject B also referred to 
using “gut feelings” when making decisions, indicating that intuition was another key 
element in the sensemaking process.  
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During the interview, an analogy was used by Subject B to simplify a complex 
problem his organization was facing. By simplifying the problem, Subject B created an 
objective that can be managed and executed. This approach diminished confusion and 
created a unified effort within Subject B’s organization. This simplification process was 
described when Subject B stated, 
You guys are going to be spending this week talking details about every 
procedure dealing with this contract, all the deliverables, you know, where 
we kind of disagree on this and that, the test schedule, all this stuff. I said, 
let me give you a north star, that was my phrase. Forty-eight out of 48. And 
everybody knew exactly what I was talking about. We were required for—
to show our reliability to have 48 test shots in the EMD. We were going to 
shoot 48 JAGM missiles. And I said, “If you can’t shoot 48, then you 
couldn’t produce 48. So, all you production quality guys, think about 48 
shots on schedule. If you can’t get there without you guys doing your 
production quality. You software guys, you can’t defeat the edge of the 
envelope targets that you’re going to be required to test against and we’re 
not going to get 48 out of 48 if you don’t do your thing.” So, you know, I 
could go on and on, but, every person in that room, regardless of their 
discipline, was able to say, “Okay, something I’m doing, I can track right 
to that north star of 48 out of 48.” 
Subject B talked about the importance of setting the conditions for success before 
entering into limited user tests (LUTs). By using past experiences, Subject B reprioritized 
the organization’s efforts to ensure system success before interacting with the user. This 
reprioritization of effort was centered on maintaining a positive reputation with current 
stakeholders, specifically with the user. Subject B referred to this when stating, 
I’ve told my boss, I’m not going to LUT until I’ve done a force deployment 
exercise or I’ve tickled everything we’re going to do in LUT, before we go 
to LUT, so that there’s no big surprises and we’re not walking out there, 
you know, staring through our closed fingers, with our fingers crossed 
hoping and praying that it goes well. And, is that going to probably cost me 
some schedule. 
4. Trust 
During the interview with Subject B, elements associated with trust were identified 
two different times. The analytic codes derived from Subject B that form the trust category 
include transparency among other organizations that have some form of influence over 
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system development. Maintaining transparency was addressed by Subject B multiple times 
throughout the interview. One example was when Subject B was describing maintaining 
transparency within the user community. Subject B explained, 
It’s another problem with this program is that my user says, we have no 
transparency, we haven’t seen anything in two years, you know, okay, my 
doors are open, you can come to every meeting that I have with the group. 
In my second week, I went out to Fort Sill, I met with the leader of the CFT, 
the one-star, and his colonels, and they said, “We’ve been asking for this, 
this, and this for forever and we haven’t gotten this.” Right, tell me exactly 
what it is, and I wrote it down, there were five things. Within a week, I had 
given them three of those things, and then we had set up meetings for the 
other two. Which I’ve since, all but one, have gone back and given it to 
them. So, they can’t keep coming and saying you’re not transparent. If they 
have other biases, that’s fine, but that’s not one that they can keep throwing 
out on the table, if I’m being transparent. 
5. Explicit Knowledge 
Elements of explicit knowledge were discussed by Subject B two times throughout 
the interview. Data was the major analytic code driving the program manager’s explicit 
knowledge. Subject B expounded upon the importance of system-level testing and setting 
the conditions for success before entering into both developmental and operational tests. 
By using data, Subject B was able to make a decision based off quantitative historical facts 
related to system performance. This decision based on data possibly prevented system 
failure, protecting the program’s reputation among the user community. Subject B referred 
to this when stating, 
Why would you go to a test if you’re not ready? Here’s what I’ll say. It’s 
because I come from the missile defense agency, where they have a very 
rigorous test readiness review before any test and if your confidence factors 
based on a gazillion (Monte Carlo) runs from all different contractors on 
your probability of successful intercept. If you’re not in the high 90s, you 
aren’t taking that shot. So, I bring the same thing to this, and it’s not because 
it doesn’t mean that we’re dumb down the test. It just means that we got to 
make sure that the system, whether it’s the JAGM missile or this thing here, 
is ready to do what it’s supposed to do in this test, and if it’s not, we’re not 
going to find out about it at the test. 
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6. Tacit Knowledge 
A tacit knowledge example was identified only once throughout the entire interview 
with Subject B. What we could derive from this one example is that Subject B’s tacit 
knowledge is related to past experiences as a program manager. Subject B has spent over 
13 years managing and developing complex weapon systems for the Army. The years of 
program management experience has laid the foundation for how naturalistic decisions are 
currently made in an ACAT 1 program. Subject B described how he used past work 
experiences to shape the decision-making process: 
I started my acquisition life in a program called Future Combat Systems, 
which you may have heard of. I was on the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) side, on the system of systems common operating 
environment. It was the software backbone for Future Combat Systems that 
was supposed to link all the hardware programs together, which is a lot, like 
the program I’m on right now, except for the failing part. After that, I went 
to Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and worked on Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAD) for four years. Two years as an APM and 
two years as a test officer during their Engineering Manufacturing and 
Development (EMD) phase, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
(IOT&E), and into production. And then, I became the Joint Air to Ground 
Missile (JAGM) project manager. And I picked that up at the end of the 
Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase, we were in a 
competition, which was a challenge because we still had to finish TMRR 
with one contractor. We weren’t really able to plan much for the next phase 
until we were able to down select, and I was the second program to ever go 
through an request for proposal (RFP) Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
at the ACAT 1 D level. So, took JAGM all the way through EMD, not all 
the way through, I re-baselined my last year, I had—I knew I needed to re-
baseline the minute that I hit the ground, and I had a chain of command that 
said, “Let’s just wait and see,” so I waited until that guy retired and then 
my boss and I said I got to re-baseline and he said absolutely, and the PEO 
supported it. We re-baselined, changed the milestone, had support from the 
building, and they just went through Milestone C in the month that I said 
they were going to be in, not because I’m any good at this, it’s just 
sometimes things are laid out clearly and you can kind of tell how they’re 
going to be.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We have concluded that the data gathered from both Subject A and B interviews 
supports five aggregate categories within the decision-making process. Within these five 
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categories, we were able to identify specific elements that shaped each program manager’s 
analytical and NDM abilities. Figure 12 captures our analytic coding and categorization of 
the data presented in this chapter and how the five aggregate categories provide insight into 
how program manager makes decisions. Additionally, environmental factors such as 
budget, requirements and the operational culture can affect the program manager’s 
decision-making process. Figure 13 depicts the number of times each aggregate category 
was identified from both Subjects A and B.  
 
Figure 12. Program Manager’s Insight Model for Decision-Making 
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Figure 13. Consolidated Categorical Interview Data 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter extrapolated and presented all the relevant data gathered from 
the interview process. This chapter presents our analysis of the factors that affect a program 
manager’s ability to gain insight into the complex decision-making process. Our analysis 
is based on the data presented in Figures 12 and 13. In this chapter, we also introduce two 
hypotheses and theories addressing the acquisition environment and how a program 
manager acquires knowledge to make complex decisions.  
B. EXAMINATION 
The data gathered, although limited in scope, tells a great deal about how a program 
manager gains insight into the decision-making process. The sheer numbers reveal that the 
environment has the largest impact on a program manager’s ability to gain insight into the 
decision-making process, followed by consensus-making, sensemaking, trust, tacit 
knowledge, and explicit knowledge. After analyzing and examining all the data gathered 
during the interview process, we have come to several conclusions. Our findings are 
highlighted in the following paragraphs.  
First of all, ACAT I program managers do not make major decisions but possess 
responsibility to influence the decision-making process. The data gathered suggests that 
ACAT I program managers do not make major system-based decisions, but rather manage 
the cost, schedule, and performance of a program through influencing key stakeholders and 
decision-making authorities. For all ACAT I programs, decision-making authority lies at 
the service acquisition executive or defense acquisition executive level. ACAT I program 
managers operate in complicated and complex environments that are muddied by 
personalities, competing goals, and sometimes counterproductive rules and regulations. 
They must understand politics, law, and the needs of several competing organizations. 
Above all, the program manager must remain neutral to requirements as they come from 
the user. 
54 
The environment described by both subjects reveals the fact that DoD program 
managers operate in generally ordered environments. Evidence suggests that DoD program 
managers operate mainly in the complicated and complex domains of the Cynefin 
Framework, rarely in the chaotic domain and never in a state of disorder. The decision-
making process is slow, calculated, and structured in comparison to decisions that are made 
instantly in combat. Rarely does a program manager have to take action to restore order 
prior to making or influencing a decision. Both subjects identified the fact that the cause-
and-effect relationship between resources and requirements is easily understood. If the 
program manager is provided with both resources and requirements, he could do his job. 
Furthermore, there is an abundance of standing operating procedures and best practices 
that attempt to simplify the process for the program management team. This is an attempt 
to pull the work of the program manager into the simple domain. 
Second, evidence suggests that DoD program managers rely on a healthy dose of 
analytic and intuitive decision-making processes to influence MDAP decisions. Figure 14 
is based on concepts from Rasmussen’s decision-making process and our interpretation of 
how program managers make decisions within the current acquisition environment. The 
figure illustrates how both time pressures and problem complexity can drive an analytical 
or naturalistic response. In our data analysis, we found that program managers rely heavily 
on analytical decision-making while using NDM to manage both internal and external 
organizational goals. For instance, both Subject A and Subject B stated that they use an 
NDM process to align stakeholders rather than make decisions. Both Subject A and Subject 
B discussed in depth their use of intuition to determine which stakeholders to manage or 
acquire. Out of the eight references to intuitive decision-making, Subjects A and B both 
referred to using intuition to get stakeholders on board eight times. Subjects A and B 
referred to the analytic decision-making process 19 different times. We assess that analytic 
decision-making plays a larger role in influencing the decision-making process itself, 





Figure 14. Program Manager Decision-Making Process 
Finally, the evidence suggests that there is a clear distinction between the art and 
science of program management. The art of program management encompasses 
sensemaking, consensus-making, and trust. We have concluded that program managers 
spend most of their time trying to align stakeholders and gain consensus in order to 
influence key decision-makers at the highest levels of the DoD. Consensus-making is the 
responsibility of the program manager and is accomplished through constant engagement 
and calculated synchronization of important stakeholders. Gaining the consensus of 
decision-makers will not only keep the program alive but will provide the necessary level 
of credibility with the user, industry, and DoD decision-making authorities.  
The science of program management is the precise application of both tacit and 
explicit knowledge. DOD acquisition professionals possess a unique set of skills and 
expertise that are necessary to successfully manage a product or program. Program 
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managers are the conduit of information between all stakeholders including industry, the 
user, and Congress. They should be relied upon to advise key decision-makers on the cost, 
schedule and performance of a program and trusted in their recommendation. From our 
research, this often is not the case and much organizational energy is wasted trying to 
educate the ignorant. Both Subjects A and B stated that the operational force wants to help 
but is often simply a nuisance.  
C. HYPOTHESES AND THEORIES  
In this section, we introduce the two hypotheses and accompanying theories that 
shed light on how a program manager gains insight in the complex decision-making 
process. Analysis of the data provided evidence that suggests that environmental factors 
and stakeholder management are the two most influential aspects of a program manager’s 
ability to shape positive programmatic results. Understanding how environmental factors 
and various stakeholders can affect program outcomes may help program managers more 
easily navigate through the complexity of ACAT 1, D programs. The following paragraphs 
introduce our hypotheses and theories.  
1. Hypothesis 1 
A program manager’s ability to make decisions is fundamentally dependent on the 
acquisition environment.  
2. Theory 1 
Both Subject A and Subject B made it clear that their ability to make a decision was 
all based on the current acquisition environment they were working in. The environmental 
examples were budget, user requirements, operational culture, and reputation. Each 
program manager discussed these environmental elements and how they impacted their 
abilities to make decisions in an acquisition environment. It also seemed that the current 
environment in which a program manager makes decisions is complex to complicated, 
never chaotic. Compared to operational leaders, program managers rarely face problems 
that require a rapid decision-making response. Program managers operate within a more 
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stable environment and are faced with complicated decisions because of the acquisition 
environment.  
How the acquisition environment influences the program manager can be viewed 
as disruptive and occasionally, hindering the decision-making process. For example, 
Subject B discussed how the current operational culture is granting operational leaders 
more authority to influence system development. This new concept, according to Subject 
B, is disruptive due to lack of training and education when it comes to understanding the 
acquisition process. Subject B dedicated a significant amount of time educating these 
senior operational leaders because of their ability to influence timelines and system 
development. The Army’s operational culture will continue to play a significant role in 
defining how the program manager will make decisions within the acquisition 
environment.  
The program manager must understand these acquisition environmental factors in 
order to prevent disruption or hinder the decision-making process. We believe that 
environmental factors have more influence on the program manager’s decision-making 
abilities than their human attributes. This is due to the Army’s organizational structure and 
senior military leader control throughout a system’s life-cycle development. Because of 
this, the program manager’s capability for decision-making has become reactive and 
dependent on the environment to support his course of action development when faced 
with complex situations.  
3. Hypothesis 2 
Consensus making is the most important activity that a program manager 
undertakes to influence his program.  
4. Theory 2 
Consensus making is an activity, not a theory. In DOD acquisition, consensus 
making involves showcasing the capabilities and benefits of a program in order to educate, 
synchronize, and align key stakeholders to shape positive programmatic outcomes. Both 
Subject A and Subject B spoke at length about the importance of gaining consensus through 
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active stakeholder management. Due to the linearity of the DOD acquisition decision-
making chain of command, managing stakeholders from the lowest-ranking user to the 
highest-ranking member in the DOD is imperative to program survival and eventual 
success. We have concluded that stakeholder management involves five critical steps: 
identification and categorization of stakeholders, educating stakeholders on program goals 
and showcasing technological capabilities and effectiveness, understanding stakeholder 
needs, synchronizing stakeholder actions, and managing steady-state stakeholder 
operations. Figure 15 highlights the steps of the DOD acquisition stakeholder management 
process.  
 
Figure 15. Acquisition Stakeholder Management Process 
First, program managers must identify all stakeholders, assess stakeholder 
influence on program goals, and map stakeholders. After assessing each stakeholder, the 
program manager must categorize them from most important to least important. This can 
be done using a simple Excel spreadsheet and a color-coding scheme, such as green 
(important), amber (somewhat important), and red (not very important). Mapping 
stakeholders allows the program manager to continuously engage priority targets, and 
analyze, assess, and evaluate stakeholder influence on a program. Subject B spoke in depth 
about this process and how effective of a tool it was in the management of stakeholders 
and the accomplishment of the overall goal to gain consensus on his program.  
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Second, program managers must educate their stakeholders on the capabilities and 
effectiveness of their program. This must be put in terms of not only cost, schedule, and 
performance, but also into simple terms of how effectively the program addresses the 
capability gap on the battlefield. A large part of educating stakeholders on DOD acquisition 
programs is showcasing the technological capabilities of any given system and highlighting 
its effectiveness in closing the capability gap on the battlefield. This is a two-pronged 
process facilitated by the prime contractor counterpart and can be conducted through 
distribution of press releases, data releases after key tests, and storyboards to the DoD chain 
of command. Highlighting a program in such a way maintains a constant state of relevance 
and keeps a program fresh in the minds of the user and DOD decision-makers.  
Third, the program manager must understand the stakeholders’ needs. This process 
is done virtually in sequence with educating the stakeholders on the program. This is a 
critically important step in the process, and without understanding stakeholder needs, the 
program manager will not be able to synchronize stakeholder efforts. This step requires a 
level of maturity and empathy on behalf of all leaders and will open a dialogue that will 
inevitably lead to tradeoffs and compromise.  
Fourth, program managers must synchronize stakeholder actions. This is the most 
difficult task the program manager will undertake in stakeholder management, but also the 
most beneficial if the program manager succeeds. Although the program manager will not 
be able to fulfill every stakeholder need, it is vitally important to entertain the most 
important objectives of each internal and external organization that has a profound impact 
on the program. Synchronizing the effort of multiple stakeholders first requires 
synchronizing the goals of all stakeholders to align with the projected outcomes of the 
program. Like a quarterback leading his team in a two-minute drill, the program manager 
must command all facets of the program from finances, to contracting, to test and 
evaluation, to manufacturing, and to production.  
Lastly, the program manager must continuously monitor and keep a pulse on 
steady-state stakeholder operations to ensure synergy through program completion. The 
stakeholder matrix mentioned in step 1 of Figure 15 is a living and breathing document 
that requires constant attention and updating. It is a document that will help facilitate the 
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management of steady-state stakeholder operations and will tell the program manager 
where he must apply attention. Managing stakeholder steady-state operations requires 
constant engagement, outreach and showcasing. It is the responsibility of the program 
manager to champion the program from the day charter is assumed.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided analysis on the data gathered during the interview process. It 
highlighted the importance of sensemaking to understand the acquisition environment, how 
program managers use data to gain consensus and influence the decision-making process, 
and how tacit knowledge and technical expertise can develop a sense of trust and 
confidence that is necessary for program success. The chapter also introduced two 
hypotheses: first, that a program manager’s ability to make decisions is dependent on the 
environment, and second, that consensus-making and stakeholder management are the two 
most important actions a program manager can take to influence his program. In the 




A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research was to identify how Army program managers make 
decisions within the current acquisition environment. From our analysis, we were able to 
identify five aggregate categories that influence a program manager’s decision-making 
process. These categories were further grouped into what we classify as the “art, skill, and 
science” of decision-making when faced with complex problems. Our hypotheses suggest 
that both environmental factors and stakeholder management are critical aspects that shape 
how program managers make decisions. Furthermore, understanding these principles and 
theories can help guide future program managers as they navigate through complex 
program environments.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Based on our research and the limited amount of information provided on the 
subject, we recommend that further research be conducted on how a program manager 
gains insight into the decision-making process. Continued research will refine the current 
understanding of how DoD acquisition professionals make decisions and could help us 
better shape future outcomes. This could result in cost and schedule savings while 
providing the warfighter with the very best capabilities on the ground. Future fights will be 
won or lost by men and women who are brave enough to sacrifice it all for the potential of 
a brighter future. We are lucky to have such brave souls with a perspective larger than just 
themselves. They deserve the very best. A program manager’s job is to deliver the very 
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